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Abstract. In this paper we consider a model where a policy maker uses advice in order to (1)
obtain information about the consequences of an innovation (information motive) and (2) to
support political legitimacy of her decision (persuasion motive). We conduct our analysis in
the context of a cheap-talk game with three players: (1) a policy maker, (2) the median voter
in parliament or of the electorate and (3) an advisor. The advisor has private information about
the consequences of policy. Communication between an advisor and a recipient improves as
their preferences are closer aligned. If the preferences of the policy maker and the median voter
are different the policy maker faces a trade-off. On the one hand, she wants to gain information
to judge whether the innovation is worthwhile. On the other hand, she needs to convince the
median voter whether the innovation is desirable.
1. Introduction
There is a growing literature in political science and economics that studies
the role of asymmetric information in the conduct of policy. One strand in the
literature focuses on asymmetries in information between political parties and
voters (Letterie and Swank, 1994; Schultz, 1994; Roemer, 1994; and Swank,
1994). In these studies political parties are better informed about the working
of the economy than voters. To convince voters that its policy is superior to
the policies proposed by the other parties, each party has an incentive to make
voters believe in a specific view of the working of the economy. For example,
a political party which proposes an increase in taxes to finance some project
has an incentive to make voters believe that the distortionary costs of taxes
are small. In Roemer and Schultz, political parties try to affect voters’ views
of the working of the economy by announcements (or talk), while in Letterie
and Swank political parties choose policies that signal a specific view of the
working of the economy.
 We thank Dan Felsenthal and A.J. Fischer for comments on an early draft of the paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society and the Economic Science
Association in Houston. We also like to thank an anonymous referee of this journal for
suggestions to improve the paper.
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Another, older, strand in the literature revolves around communication
between policy makers and experts. In studies on bureaucracy (Niskanen,
1971), bureaucrats are the experts, in some other studies committee members
have superior information about policy effects (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989)
and sometimes policy advisors are experts (Calvert, 1985). In all these studies,
policy makers have typically less information about the efficacy of policy than
experts. The experts in these studies are ordinary human beings who have their
own preferences. When experts’ and policy makers’ preferences diverge, the
experts may have incentives to provide biased information to the policy maker
to induce her to implement policies which are in their interests.
These two strands of the literature show that as to information the policy
maker plays two roles. In the second strand of the literature, policy maker’s
demand for information is at the centre of interest, while in the first, the
policy maker supplies information. In this paper, we make a first attempt
to draw together the two strands in the literature by examining a model in
which a policy maker consults experts on the one hand to acquire information
about policy effects and on the other hand to convince other agents of the
net-benefits of their policies.
The model to be examined builds on Calvert (1985). The policy maker
must make a decision about whether or not to undertake a particular project.
The net-benefits of the project are surrounded with uncertainty. The policy
maker can reduce this uncertainty by consulting an advisor, thereby reducing
the probability that he makes a “wrong” decision. Advisors differ in their
predisposition towards the project, so that the policy maker is confronted
with the problem of the selection of an advisor. The model deviates from
Calvert in that game theoretical principles are used to examine the interactions
between the policy maker and the advisor. Moreover, in our model the policy
maker faces a political constraint: Undertaking the project requires approval
by parliament or by voters through a referendum. As a consequence, in our
model the advisor is not only a source of information for the policy maker;
he may also be used to convince parliament of the net-benefits of the project.
Our model can be regarded as an extension of the models analysed in studies
belonging to the first strand in the literature. In these studies the motivation
for the assumption that the policy maker is better informed than voters is
that policy makers have better access to experts and bureaucrats (see also
Cukierman and Tommasi, 1994). We maintain the assumption that policy
makers have better access to experts, but model the interactions between
policy makers and experts explicitly.
Our analysis shows that when selecting advisors, policy makers may face
a trade-off between acquiring information to avoid “wrong” decisions and
supplying information to persuade other agents. As in Calvert (1985), to
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acquire information the policy maker has an incentive to consult an advisor
whose predisposition towards the project is close to that of himself (Section 2).
This result is common in cheap talk games which show that communication
between players usually improves when their preferences are closer aligned
(Crawford and Sobel, 1982). In contrast, to convince parliament, the policy
maker has an incentive to consult an advisor whose predisposition towards
the project is closer to the predisposition of the median voter in parliament
(Section 3).
2. The model
In this section we discuss a simple game in which a policy maker and a
policy advisor are the players. The policy maker must make a decision about
whether a particular project should be undertaken. The policy maker can
choose between two alternatives. First, she can retain the status quo (s), in
which case her utility is given by Up(s) = 0, and second she can undertake the
project (x), in which case her utility is given by:
Up(x j ) = p +  (1)
where  is a stochastic term which has a uniform distribution over the interval
[–t, t]1 and p denotes the policy maker’s bias towards the innovation. Before
the policy maker decides upon the project she can consult an advisor to inform
herself about the realization of .
There exists a continuum of policy advisors in terms of their predispositions
towards the project (ak). If the policy maker chooses to undertake the project,
advisor j’s utility is given by:
Uaj(x j ) = aj + : (2)
All advisors are assumed to attribute zero utility to the status quo (Uj(s) =
0).2 The parameters aj and p and the distribution of  are common knowledge.
However, the advisors are assumed to have private information about the
realisation of .3 The advisor can send two messages to the policy maker:
the innovation is good or the innovation is bad, implying that messages are
imprecise to some extent. This assumption is not crucial in the game we
consider. It is valid because the decision about implementing the innovation
is a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision, implying that ‘yes’ or ‘no’ messages are suitable.
The existence of different advisors confronts the policy maker with the
problem of the selection of an advisor, aj. This decision is therefore part of
the model. It is assumed that apart from advisors’ predispositions towards the
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project, advisors do not differ. Thus all advisors are assumed to be equally
competent.
The model is deliberately held as simple as possible. One interpretation of
the model is that the benefits of the project are unevenly distributed among
citizens (and advisors) and that the costs of the project, which are surrounded
with uncertainty (), are equally distributed among citizens. Then, aj refers to
the net benefits of the project received by advisor j, and p denotes the benefits
received by the policy maker or her constituency.
It is evident from (1) that if the policy maker does not consult an advisor,
her decision concerning the project depends on p. If the policy maker is biased
towards undertaking the project (p > 0), then she will undertake the project
and if p < 0, then she will retain the status quo. From now on, it is assumed
that the policy maker is biased in favour of undertaking the project (p > 0).4
Furthermore, it is clear that if t < p, then information about  never affects the
policy decision, so that advice has no value. Thus, we focus on the interesting
case where t > p.
Formally, the stages of the game can be described as follows:
1. The policy maker chooses a policy advisor aj;
2. Nature reveals the value of  to the policy advisors, but not to the policy
maker;
3. The advisor chooses message G = fundertake the projectg or B = fdo not
undertake the projectg;
4. The policy maker revises her belief about , using Bayes’ rule. She makes
a decision concerning the project, (SP, XP).
2.1. Equilibria
The game between the policy maker and the advisor has several perfect
Bayesian equilibria. Necessary conditions for these equilibria are that the
players’ actions must be optimal responses to each other and that the policy
maker’s belief about must follow Bayes’ rule. Two types of equilibria can be
distinguished: pooling and partially pooling equilibria of which the latter type
is most interesting. An important feature of a partially pooling equilibrium is
that communication between the policy maker and the advisor occurs, in the
sense that the advisor’s message affects policy maker’s decision concerning
the project by providing further information about . Obviously, all advisors
with aj < –t would like the policy maker to believe that the innovation is
bad. Messages sent by those advisors are not credible and accordingly do not
provide information about . Likewise, communication cannot occur if aj > t.
For this reason, we restrict attention to those cases where aj lies in the interval
[–t, t].
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Using (2) we obtain that if aj = –, the advisor wants the policy maker to
undertake the project. If message G may induce the policy maker to undertake
the project, the advisor should send message G if  is an element of [–aj, t]. In
contrast if  is an element of [–t, –aj), the advisor should send message B. Now
consider the optimal response of the policy maker to the advisor’s strategy.
Message G reveals that  lies within the interval [–aj, t] and message B reveals
that  is an element of [–t, aj). Thus the expected value of  conditional on the
advisor’s message equals:
E( j B) = 1/2( t   aj) < 0 (3)
E( j G) = 1/2(t   aj) > 0 (4)
and policy maker’s expected utility attributed to the innovation becomes:
E(Up(x) j B) = p + 1/2( t   aj) (5)
E(Up(x) j G) = p + 1/2(t   aj) > 0 (6)
It is evident from (6) that if the advisor sends message G, the policy
maker will undertake the project. If the policy maker observes B, her decision
concerning the project depends on the advisor’s predisposition towards the
project, aj. First, suppose the advisor is strongly biased against the innovation
(aj < 2p–t), so that E(U(x) j B) > 0. Hence, the policy maker still expects
higher utility from the innovation than from the status quo and her optimal
response to the message is to ignore it. Then, the advisor may send any
message. In this case a pooling equilibrium occurs. Second, if aj > 2p–
t, expected utility associated with the innovation is negative if message B
is observed. As a consequence, if the policy maker observes message B,
she retains the status quo. Thus, in this case information is revealed about
the realization of  and the policy maker’s action depends on the advisor’s
message: If G is observed the policy maker undertakes the project and if B
is observed the policy maker retains the status quo. Then a partially pooling
equilibrium holds. As is common in cheap-talk games, also in case aj > 2p–t, a
pooling equilibrium may arise, which however is not very likely. If there is an
infinitesimal probability that the policy maker follows the policy advise, both
the advisor and the policy maker act as in the partially pooling equilibrium.
Hence, if we restrict attention to stable equilibria, a pooling equilibrium holds
if aj < 2p–t and a partially pooling equilibrium holds if aj > 2p–t.
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2.2. The optimal policy advisor
The above analysis concerns the stages 2–4 of our model. In determining the
selection of the optimal policy advisor, aj, we can ignore pooling equilibria,
because there the value of the message is zero. In fact, the policy maker
should never choose an advisor characterized by aj < 2p–t. In a partially
pooling equilibrium, the advisor’s message induces policy maker’s decision.
Policy maker’s expected utility is equal to:
E(U) = Prob(G)  E(U(x) j G) = 1
2t
[p(t + aj) + 1/2(t2   a2j )] (7)
Differentiating (7) with respect to aj yields the first-order condition: p – aj
= 0. Hence, the predisposition towards the innovation of the optimal advisor
coincides with that of the policy maker. The intuition of this result is clear. If
aj = p, the advisor sends message G if  > –p and message B if  < –p. This is
the information the policy maker needs. Hence, as in most cheap-talk games,
communication is optimal if the players’ interests are perfectly aligned.
In summary, the following strategies and beliefs form a stable Bayesian
equilibrium:
Advisor :

send G if aj   
send B if aj < :
(Ia)
Beliefs :

E( j B) = 1/2( t   aj)
E( j G) = 1/2(t   aj)
(Ib)
Policy maker
8
<
:
Xp if message = G
Sp if message = B
aj = p:
(Ic)
3. Political constraints
In the previous section, the policy maker consults an advisor to acquire infor-
mation about the desirability of an innovation. Implicitly, we have assumed
that if the policy maker expects that the innovation increases her utility, she
has the power to undertake the project. In many countries, however, policy
innovations have to be approved by parliament. Often this confronts the policy
maker with the problem of convincing members of parliament that the inno-
vation is in their interests. This political constraint adds a new dimension to
the role of advisors. Apart from acquiring information about the desirability
of a project, a policy maker may consult an advisor to persuade members of
parliament to support the innovation.
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In this section we examine the role of the advisor in a political context.
The model employed is an extension of the model discussed in the previous
section. We maintain the stages 1–4 discussed before and add to the model
that the innovation requires approval by parliament. To hold the model simple,
we assume that only the policy maker is able to consult an advisor and that
the policy maker cannot be forced to undertake the project.
Parliamentary approval requires that a simple majority votes for the inno-
vation. Parliament consists of n members, who differ in their predispositions
towards the project. The utility functions of members of parliament are sim-
ilar to those of the advisors and the policy maker. It is easy to show that in
this setting the vote of the median member of parliament (henceforth median
voter) is decisive. The median voter’s utility function is given by:
Um(x j ) = m +  and Um(s) = 0: (8)
When the policy maker puts forward a proposal to undertake the project to
parliament, the median voter can choose between two actions: she can support
the proposal (Xm) and she can vote against the proposal (Sm). In the present
model, the project is only undertaken when the policy maker chooses Xp and
the median voter chooses Xm.
The following assumptions are made about the median voter’s and the
policy maker’s preferences. First, we maintain the assumption that the policy
maker is biased towards undertaking the project (p > 0). Second, in contrast
to the policy maker, the median voter is biased against undertaking the project
(m < 0). Third, the extent to which the median voter is biased against the
innovation is uncertain. This is formalized by assuming that m is distributed
uniformly over the interval [me–e, me+e], where me is the expected value of
m and e is the half-width of the distribution. Finally, we assume that me+e
> –t.
The resulting model describes a situation where the policy maker’s and the
median voter’s preferences are (partially) opposed. The second assumption
implies that in a pooling equilibrium, in which no communication between
the advisor and the median voter occurs, the project is not undertaken. As
a consequence, if the policy maker wants to undertake the project, she must
convince the median voter to vote for the innovation. The last assumption is
made to ensure that the problem of the selection of an advisor is an interesting
one. If me+e < –t, the median voter always votes against the innovation,
irrespective of the realisation of . Then the policy maker may choose any
advisor, who may send any message, so that a pooling equilibrium occurs.
The extension of the model discussed in Section 2 with the median voter,
implies that there are now two receivers of the message sent by the advisor.
Basically, the equilibrium concept remains the same. Now the three players’
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strategies have to be optimal responses to each others’ strategies and both
receivers must update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule. The following strategies
and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
Advisor:

send G if aj   
send B if aj < 
(IIa)
Median voter:

Xm if message = G and m + E(jG)  0
Sm if message = B or if m + E(jG) < 0
(IIb)
Beliefs:

E(jB) = 1/2( t   aj)
E(jG) = 1/2(t   aj)
(IIc)
Policy maker:

Xp if message = G
Sp or Xp if message = B
(IId)
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
aj = p if me   e  1/2(p   t)
aj = 1/3[2(m + e) + t + 2p]+
 
1/3f[2(m + e) + t + 2p]2+
 12(m + e)p + 3t2g1/2
if me   e < 1/2(p   t)
(IIe)
To show that the above strategies and beliefs form perfect Bayesian equilibria,
we distinguish two cases.
3.1. Case (I): m   e  1/2(p   t)
If aj    the advisor prefers the project to the status quo and if aj < – the
advisor prefers the status quo to the project. Hence, sending message G in
case aj  – and sending message B in case aj < – is optimal if G leads and
B does not lead to implementation of the project. Below it is shown that this
is indeed the case.
The optimal response of the median voter to the message G is to vote for
the proposal Xp, since expected utility of the innovation is positive if G is
observed (m+1/2(t–p)  0). If the message is B the median voter rejects the
proposal Xp, because in that case he expects the innovation to yield a lower
utility than the status quo (m+1/2(–t–p) < 0).
The strategy of the policy maker concerns a decision whether or not to pro-
pose the innovation and a decision which advisor to consult. If the message G
is observed the policy maker attains higher expected utility from the innova-
tion than from the status quo because p + 1/2(t–aj) is positive. In that case the
policy maker knows that if she proposes the innovation the median voter will
support it. Hence, it is optimal to propose the innovation if G is observed. If
the message B is observed the policy maker is indifferent between Xp and Sp,
since then the median voter in parliament will reject the innovation.
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The discussion of the strategies of the policy maker and the median voter
shows that the project is undertaken if the advisor sends the message G. The
status quo remains in case message B is sent. Hence, the policy maker’s
expected utility is the same as in Section 2.2:
E(U) = Prob(G)  E(U(x) j G) = 1
2t
[p(t + aj) + 1/2(t2   a2j )] (9)
Again, the policy maker can determine the optimal advisor by maximizing
(9) with respect to aj. The solution to this problem yields aj = p.
In the present case, the outcomes of the game with the median voter are
similar to the outcomes of the game without a median voter. Of course, the
reason for this is that the median voter is only weakly biased against the
policy innovation. As a consequence, message G from an advisor whose
predisposition coincides with that of the policy maker convinces the median
voter that the proposal must be accepted.
3.2. Case (II): me   e < 1/2(p   t)
In this case uncertainty about the preferences of the median voter affects
the characteristics of our model. The median voter’s decision concerning the
innovation depends on m. If message G is sent by the advisor the median
voter votes for the innovation if m  –1/2(t–aj) and otherwise he votes against
it. As before a message B convinces the median voter that the innovation is
not in his interest, because m < 0.
It is optimal for the advisor to send message G if   –aj and message B
otherwise, if there is a positive probability that the project is undertaken when
message G is sent. Since the policy maker always puts forward the proposal
to parliament if message G is sent (p > 0), this requires that Prob(m+E( j
G)>0) > 0. In Appendix C it is shown that this inequality holds for the advisor
selected by the policy maker.
Since there is a positive probability that the median voter votes for the
innovation if message G is sent and p > 0, message G induces the policy
maker to propose the innovation to parliament. Because message B induces
the median voter to vote against the proposal, the policy maker is indifferent
between Xp and Sp when message B is sent.
Finally, we have to show that the policy maker selects an advisor charac-
terised by (IIf). Obviously, given the above strategies and beliefs, the policy
maker’s utility is equal to zero if message B is sent or if the median voter
votes against the innovation. The policy maker attains positive utility if the
advisor sends message G and the median voter votes for the innovation. Policy
maker’s expected utility is equal to:
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E(Up) = Prob(G)  E(U(x) j G)  Prob(m + E( j G) > 0)
=
1
2t [p(t + aj) + 1/2(t
2
  a2j )] 12e [m
e
+ e + 1/2(t   aj)]
(10)
The last term of (10) reflects that if the median voter observes message G
there is still a chance that he votes against the proposal. In Appendix A it is
shown that maximising (10) with respect to aj and solving for aj yield (IIf).
In contrast to the model discussed in Section 2 the present model does not
yield a transparent expression for the optimal advisor (at least for me   e <
1/2(p t)). To gain insight into the factors determining the nature of the advisor,
we differentiate (IIf) with respect to the key parameters of the model yielding:
1 > @aj=@p > 0; @aj=@me > 0 and @aj=@e > 0: (11)
(see Appendix B). Hence,
the more the policy maker is biased towards the innovation (p)
the less the median voter is biased against the innovation (me)
the greater is the uncertainty about m (e)
9
=
;
the
higher
is aj
The above comparative static results clearly illustrate that in selecting an
advisor, the policy maker faces a trade off between acquiring information and
providing information. On the one hand, the policy maker has an incentive
to choose an advisor whose predisposition is near his own predisposition
to obtain information about the desirability of undertaking the project. On
the other hand, the policy maker is inclined to choose an advisor whose
predisposition is closer to that of the median voter to convince the median
voter of the desirability of the project. This trade off implies that if the
benefits from acquiring information increase or the benefits from providing
information decrease the policy maker chooses a higher aj.
The first comparative static result states than an increase in p induces
the policy maker to choose a higher aj. Communication between the policy
maker and the advisor deteriorates if the policy maker would not consult an
advisor with a higher predisposition towards the project. Basically, this effect
is analogous to the finding in Section 2. However, the effect of an increase in
p on aj is smaller than in Section 2, because an increase in aj is expected to
decrease communication between the median voter and the advisor.
The second result identifies the effect of the median voter’s expected pre-
disposition on aj. A rise in me reduces the conflict between the median voter
and the policy maker. As a consequence, the benefits of providing informa-
tion by choosing a low aj reduce. This finding suggests that the median voter
has an incentive to pretend to be more biased against the innovation than he
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actually is. This provokes the policy maker to choose a lower aj, so that the
median voter obtains more information about .
Finally, the third result states that greater uncertainty about the median
voter’s predisposition increases aj. A higher value of e implies that the median
voter’s decision concerning the project depends more heavily on the realisa-
tion of m and less on aj. In fact, the policy maker becomes more uncertain
about whether communication between the advisor and the median voter
occurs. This reduces the benefits from providing information and therefore
induces the policy maker to choose a higher value of aj. This result indi-
cates that although the median voter has an incentive to pretend to be more
biased against the innovation than he actually is, he has no incentive to create
uncertainty about his predisposition.
4. Discussion
In this paper we have analysed a model in which a policy maker may consult
an advisor for two reasons. First, a policy maker may interact with experts in
order to gain information about the consequences of the decisions she makes
(i.e., information motive). Second, a policy maker may choose an advisor
in order to support political legitimacy of her policy decisions. To put it
differently, a properly chosen expert may help a policy maker to convince
parliament or the electorate about the desirability of policy measures (i.e.,
persuasion motive).
In our model there are three players: (1) a policy maker; (2) the median
voter of parliament or of the electorate; (3) an advisor. The advisor has private
information about the consequences of policy. Communication between an
advisor and a recipient improves as their preferences are closer aligned.
Hence, preferences play an important role in our analysis. We have obtained
the following results.
First, if the preferences of the policy maker and the median voter are
closely aligned, the policy maker chooses an advisor who provides the precise
information she wants. In this case the information motive dominates the
persuasion motive.
Second, if the preferences of the policy maker and the median voter become
more opposed, then the preferences of the optimal advisor are more in line
with the preferences of the median voter. Now the persuasion motive becomes
more important.
Third, higher uncertainty about the preferences of the median voter decreas-
es the difference between the preferences of the optimal advisor and the prefer-
ences of the policy maker. Thus, uncertainty increases the relative importance
of the information motive to the persuasion motive.
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Some extensions of the model are left for future research. First, we have
assumed that the advisor is for free. Relaxing this assumption does not affect
our results as long as (a) payments to the advisor are not state contingent
and (b) if the benefits of the advisor to the policy maker (concerning gaining
information and convincing the median voter) outweigh the cost. Second,
the model can be analysed in a dynamic setting. This raises the issue of the
advisor’s reputation. Still the same results of our analysis apply, if payments
to the advisor’s are not state contingent and if the advisor discounts the future
heavily. Third, in our model we have assumed that the policy maker can
choose only one advisor. Although this is a simplification, in a multi-advisor
setting the policy maker still has an incentive to distort information provision
to the median voter in order to increase the probability of acceptance of the
innovation (like in Section 3). Therefore, we believe the nature of our results
to remain if a policy maker can choose more advisors.
Finally, our model revolves around a “yes or no” decision. This raises the
question whether our results extend to a decision about how much money to
spend on a project. Because the analysis of a model with continuous message
and action spaces is very difficult, we have not considered this case. However,
we conjecture that the spirit of our model will not change. Crawford and Sobel
(1982) show that with continuous action and message spaces, the type space
of messages is divided in intervals. In partially pooling equilibria, different
types of senders send different messages. In our model, this would imply that
the selected advisor makes a statement about the proper range in which the
amount of money to spend on the project should lie. Again however, perfect
communication between the advisor and the policy maker is possible if their
preferences are perfectly aligned. Hence to obtain information, the policy
maker should consult an advisor whose predisposition towards the project
is equal to that of herself. Adding a political constraint to the model may
induce the policy maker to consult an advisor whose predisposition is closer
to that of the median voter. If he does not, and the median voter is strongly
biased against the innovation, no communication between the advisor and the
median voter will occur, so that the proposal will be rejected.
Notes
1. The results of the analysis do not depend on the assumption concerning the distribution
of .
2. This is simply a normalisation. If advisors differ in their attitudes towards the status quo
this can be captured by the parameter aj in (2) without loss of generality.
3. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the advisors know the realisation of  exactly. This
assumption is not responsible for the results of this paper. For example, adding another
stochastic term to (1) and (2), so that the advisors are also imperfectly informed about the
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effects of the innovation does not alter our conclusions. What matters is that the advisors
are better informed about the effects of the innovation than the policy maker.
4. The analysis of the opposite case (p < 0) is analogous. Moreover, throughout the paper it
is assumed that any player in the game who is indifferent between the status quo and the
innovation supports the innovation.
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Appendix A
The policy maker chooses the advisor by maximizing her expected utility:1
E(Up) =
1
2t
[p(t + a) +
1
2
(t2   a2)]
1
2e
[me + e +
1
2
(t  a)] (A1)
with respect to a. To find a maximum we derive the first-order condition
@E(Up)
@a
=
1
4et
[(p  a)(me + e + 1
2
(t  a)) 
1
2
[p(t + a) + 1
2
(t2   a2)]] = 0 (A2)
After some straightforward algebra it can be shown, that the above equation holds
if
3
4
a2   a[Q + 1
2
t + p]  1
4
t2 + pQ = 0
where Q = me + e. There are two solutions to this quadratic function:
a =
2Q + t + 2p
3 
p
(2Q + t + 2p)2   12pQ + 3t2
3 =
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=
2Q + t + 2p
3 
p
(t + 2p Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
3
To see which solution yields a maximum we calculate the second-order derivative
of E(Up) with respect to a:
@
2E(Up)
@a2
=
1
8te(3a  [2Q + t + 2p]) (A3)
This equation has to be negative. This holds when
a = a =
2Q + t + 2p
3  
p
(t + 2p Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
3 (A4)
Note
1. To facilitate notation we drop the subscript j of a.
Appendix B
We determine how the expression for the optimal advisor depends on some parameters of the
model. First, we derive the partial derivative of a* with respect to me. Note that me enters as a
determinant of a through Q, because Q = me + e. Hence,
@a
@me
=
@a
@Q
@Q
@me
=
@a
@Q (B1)
because the first-order derivative of Q with respect to me equals 1.
@a
@me
=
2
3  
1
3
1
2
6(t + Q)  2(t + 2p  Q)
p
(t + 2p  Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
=
2
3  
2
3
2Q + t  p
p
(t + 2p  Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
=
2
3
"
1  Q  pp
(t + 2p  Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
 
Q + t
(t + 2p  Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
#
Since Q–p < 0 and Q+t > 0, it holds that
@a
@me
>
2
3
"
1  Q + tp
(t + 2p  Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
#
>
>
2
3
"
1  Q + tp
3(t + Q)2
#
=
2
3

1  1p
3

> 0 (B2)
Second, we derive how a* depends on e. Because e enters as a determinant of a* through Q, it
follows straightforwardly that
@a
@e
=
@a
@Q
@Q
@e
=
@a
@me
> 0 (B3)
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Third, we derive how a* is related to p.
@a
@p
=
2
3  
1
3
1
2
4(t + 2p Q)
p
(t + 2p Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
= (B4)
=
2
3
"
1  t + 2p  Qp
(t + 2p Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
#
>
2
3
"
1  t + 2p  Qp
(t + 2p  Q)2
#
= 0
Furthermore,
@a
@p
=
2
3
"
1  t + 2  Qp
(t + 2p  Q)2 + 3(t + Q)2
#
<
2
3 < 1 (B5)
Appendix C
We have to show that in equilibrium the probability that the median voter votes for the
innovation given that message G is sent is positive:
Prob(m + E(" j G) > 0) =
me+e
Z
 
1
2 (t a

)
1
2e
dm > 0
The above inequality applies if  1/2(t  a) < me + e. This holds if a   2Q  t < 0. Using
a

=
1
3 [2Q + t + 2p] 
2
3
p
(Q  p)2 + (Q + t)(p + t) (C1)
we see that
a   2Q  t = 23 [p  t  2Q]  23
p
(Q  p)2 + (Q + t)(p + t) =
=
2
3
h
(p  Q)  (Q + t) 
p
(p  Q)2 + (Q + t)(p + t)
i
<
<
2
3
h
(p  Q)  (Q + t) 
p
(p  Q)2
i
=  
2
3 (Q + t) < 0
since (1) p > Q = me + e and (2) Q + t = me + e + t > 0 by assumption.
